SKU: 57304995368

Gustavo Montoya - Pescadoras, dos niñas con artes de pesca

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Gustavo Montoya - Pescadoras, dos niñas con artes de pescaGustavo Montoya Pescadoras, dos nias con artes de pesca Unframed silkscreen prints in colors on paper, signed lower right G. Montoya (Gustavo Montoya, Mexican, 1905 2003), from the "Ninos Mexicanos" series, published by Bernard Lewin Galleries, each signed lower right, from an edition of 250, with a blind stamp. Each sheet measures 27 x 21 inches 67. 5 x 52. 5cm.) and they were done in 1985. Printed by Multiarte Editions, Enrique Cattaneo Workshop.

Gustavo Montoya - Pescadoras, dos niñas con artes de pesca

Unframed silkscreen prints in colors on paper, signed lower right G. Montoya (Gustavo Montoya, Mexican, 1905-2003), from the "Ninos Mexicanos" series, published by Bernard Lewin Galleries, each signed lower right, from an edition of 250, with a blind stamp.
Each sheet measures 27 x 21 inches 67.5 x 52.5cm.) and they were done in 1985. 

Printed by Multiarte Editions, Enrique Cattaneo Workshop.

The Mexican Children series, Gustavo Montoya contributed to the aesthetics of the Mexicanity of the twentieth century. It puts us in front of the nuances of traditional Mexico: the face of the children of Taz Morena and almond eyes; The watermelon that color the markets, the dish of Olinalá, the hand painted chair, the sound of the jarana and the earth that step on the bare feet.

To get an idea of the retail value of these work:

https://gustavomontoyaserigraphs.com

Gustavo Montaya (Mexico City, July 9, 1905 - July 12, 2003) was an artist associated with the Mexican School of Painting. Born to a father who worked for the government under Porfirio Diaz, Montoya's family was forced to go into hiding after its overthrow at the beginning of the Mexican Revolution, often moving from home to home at night and adopting different disguises to evade the Zapatistas. At the age of 4, Montoya had already begun to present phobias and a deep depression that were only exacerbated by the Revolution's effect on his life, a violent father, and a neurotic and strictly religious mother.

At the age of fifteen Montoya entered the Academy of San Carlos where he studied under German Gedovius and Roberto Montegro. Although he had to overcome the objections of his father to enter the school, Montoya ultimately felt that the school taught him the craft of painting and not the spirit, and for this reason he considered himself a largely self-taught artist. He began his artistic career making paintings for posters with West Coast Theaters Co in Hollywood, CA after marrying his first wife Luz Saavedra. Their relationship was not to last and Montoya eventually returned to Mexico City to marry Cordelia Urueta, convincing her to rent studio space with a number of other artists.

Urueta took a position at the Mexican Embassy in Paris which, when Montoya received a grant from the Mexican government to study avant garde art in Switzerland, Italy, and England, allowed him to further refine his style in addition to experimenting with techniques such as painting with his non-dominant left hand. Making a stop to exhibit his work in New York City, the artist returned to Mexico in 1942, where he joined his contemporaries in the Mexican movement emphasizing neo-realism and muralistic techniques.

Montoya is most well-known for his colorful portraits of children in Mexico City, often accompanied by simple backdrops including apartment rooms or mountainous scenery. Focusing on the poor and working class, his portraits and street scenes portrayed people in the traditional style of the region, which has since earned him the esteem of collectors with appreciation for the Mexican School of Painting. In addition to portraits and scenes of the street and market, Montoya painted still lifes of Mexican food, often featuring the fruits and breads of the area. He was a founding member of the Salon de la Plastica Mexicana (The Hall of Mexican Fine Art) and Liga de Escritores y Artistas Revolucionarios, a group of revolutionary writers and artists against government censorship and violations of universal peace in the name of Nationalism such as Hitler and Mussolini's ambitions and actions by the leaders Spanish Civil War.

Referred to as a "Great Silent One" in a posthumous anthology of work issued by the Museo Mural Diego Rivera in 1997, during his life Montoya exhibited at the Durand Gallery, the Galeria de Plastica Mexicana of Ines Amor, the first Bienal Mexicana at the Palacio de Bellas Artes, the second Bienal Panamericana, Beverly Hills Collectors Gallery in Los Angeles, the Museum of Modern Art in San Antonio, Texas, Galeria Arte Nucleo, and Galerie Marstelle. He died on July 12, 2003, survived by his third wife Trina Hungria.


The best-known artists in Mexico from the early decades of the twentieth century are Diego Rivera, José Clemente Orozco (1883–1949), and David Alfaro Siqueiros (1896–1974)—“Los tres grandes” (The Three Greats). They were all committed to politics but expressed their views through their art in very different ways. Of the three, Rivera—who returned to Mexico from Europe at the invitation of the government in 1921 to work on a mural project—rose to greatest prominence. Rivera’s 1932 lithograph Emiliano Zapata and His Horse, based on a detail from one of his murals at the Palace of Cortés Cuernavaca to the south of Mexico City, has become an iconic twentieth-century print. Zapata was a landowner-turned-revolutionary who formed and led the Liberation Army of the South. He embodied the aims of agrarian struggle that aspired to improve conditions for those who worked on the land. Zapata was assassinated in April 1919. Rivera’s print conflates different moments of oppression with optimistic emancipation. It was commissioned and published by the Weyhe Gallery in New York for sale to American collectors. Orozco and Siqueiros also made prints for the U.S. market, a number of which are devoid of political content.

The establishment of the print collective known as the Taller de Gráfica Popular (Workshop of Popular Graphic Art, TGP) in Mexico City in 1937 best expresses the symbiosis between prints and politics that had developed in Mexico. Its founders, Leopoldo Méndez (1902–1969), Luis Arenal (1908/9–1985) and Pablo (Paul) O’Higgins (1904–1983), were committed communists who abandoned mural painting to concentrate on printmaking, demonstrating how important prints had become as a vehicle for artistic, social, and political expression. Some of its members had belonged to the League of Writers and Revolutionary Artists (LEAR), which had been launched in 1934. The TGP has a fascinating history steeped in astonishing artistic production and political intrigue. The Bolshevik revolutionary and Marxist theorist Leon Trotsky arrived in Mexico in 1937, much to the horror of the communists represented by Siqueiros, who regarded him as a pro-fascist provocateur. Rivera was a supporter of Trotsky and established a Mexican branch of the Fourth International, a socialist organization that had its own journal, Clave, and ran articles attacking the USSR and the Mexican Communist Party. Siqueiros, then a guest member of the TGP, with fellow printmakers Antonio Pujol (1913–1995) and Luis Arenal, led an attempt to assassinate Trotsky in May 1940. The TGP workshop was their rendezvous point. After the failed attempt, Pujol ended up in prison and Siqueiros fled the country. Their action caused terrible ruptures in the TGP, with some remaining committed to the communist cause and others pressing for a more moderate line.

By 1947, the year that the Society of Mexican Printmakers was founded, printmaking had broadened its horizons far beyond its proletarian roots. In fact, printmaking was now considered to be the most intimate of media. Post World War II artist felt a need to reassert private values in opposition to highly politicized work. They opened the way to more subjective investigations of personal identity and myth.

Jose Luis Cuevas, Rufino Tamayo, and Francisco Toledo are fine examples of the new sensibility. These later artists have kept alive Mexico’s reputation for excellence in the graphic arts. A common Mexican trait on either side of the U.S.–Mexico border is the passionate interest in Mexicanidad (Mexicanness) and what comprises Mexican identity. Perhaps this obsession to understand the concept of Mexicanidad comes from nearly five centuries of mestizaje – the interracial and cultural mixing that first occurred in Mesoamerica among Native Indigenous groups, European Spanish and enslaved Africans during the 1520s. By the 18th century, Mexican identity had developed. Mestizaje was the process that constructed it. The museum’s permanent collection showcases the dynamic and distinct Mexican stories in North America, and sheds light on why Mexican identity cannot be regarded as singular; its vast diversity defies any notion of one linear history. -

Nuestras Historias destaca la colección permanente del museo, la cual expone las historias dinámicas y diversas de la identidad mexicana en Norteamérica. La exhibición muestra la identidad cultural como algo que evoluciona continuamente a través del tiempo, de regiones y de comunidades,  en vez de señalarla como una entidad estática e inmutable, exhibiendo para esto, artefactos mesoamericanos y coloniales, arte moderno mexicano, arte popular, y arte contemporáneo de los dos lados de la frontera EE.UU-México.  La gran diversidad de identidades mexicanas mostradas en estas obras desafía la noción de una sola historia lineal e identidad única. 



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A
Lowell, US
★★★★★ 3
Good to excellent content - terrible publishing policy
Format: Hardcover
Lewis (Not "Flewis") wrote a decent text a number of years ago. It was then expanded to a companion volume (Analytical Sedimentology) with another author. The two nicely complement each other but the mind boggles at a price of almost $100 per each. The publisher has clearly made little effort to control the cost. Redundancy between the two volumes is excessive, hard cover rather than soft is used and, indeed, both could easily have been combined in one less pricey volume. A valuable resource to students and professionals has therefore been compromised by publisher, author or both due to ignorance, greed or stupidity. A terrible shame!
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Reviewed in the United States on January 5, 1998
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JMB1014
Whiting, US
★★★★★ 5
An Excellent Introduction to Legal and Constitutional Reasoning
Format: Hardcover
This is an excellent introductory volume for people who feel confused by the debate over "original intent" versus a "living Constitution." David A. Strauss is a law professor at the University of Chicago. His book is a quick read (139 pages), with no notes, bibliography or other impedimenta - just an index. It's a very lucid explanation of legal reasoning and how the Supreme Court has followed this basic process over time. Hence the "living constitution" is really just an instance of the English common law tradition functioning normally. This book will teach many Americans how legal reasoning actually operates in practice. It is a common-sensical and conservative process that seeks at once to promote predictability and fairness. By and large, it has worked well. The phrase "living Constitution" has been denigrated by people who seek to turn back the calendar to a day when more "traditional" values were imposed by law. In so doing, they have invoked an historical fiction, the "original intent" of the framers of the Constitution. The myriad problems arising from this effort, if not its disingenuousness, have been discussed with insight and erudition by such excellent minds as Jack Rakove ("Original Meanings")and Akhil Reed Amar ("The Bill of Rights," and "The American Constitution: A Biography"), to name just two. The real point of this book, I think, is to explain basic legal reasoning to a mass audience. This does a great service. It also shows how naturally the common law evolves, how it tends to restrain judicial activism and yet to permit flexibility as times and circumstances change. As Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School put it in his book, "The Spirit of the Common Law," the common law is "essentially a mode of judicial and juristic thinking, a mode of treating legal problems rather than a fixed body of definite rules...." This is a critical distinction. Some so-called conservatives insist that judges must simply apply the law like automatons, as if it were a "fixed body of definite rules." They then seek to enlist the founding fathers in declaring what those rules are, or how definite they must be. But as Dean Pound and centuries of legal history demonstrate, this notion is far removed from the truth, and remote from any useful notion of adjudication. All Anglophone law schools, lawyers and judges are engaged in the process Dean Pound discusses. The common law tradition arose in England over the course of centuries. We imported it to this country in part because it was workable and practical, and because it was brilliantly and systematically expounded by Chief Justice Edward Coke in the 17th century and by Lord William Blackstone shortly before the American Revolution. No one would suggest that the common law tradition means the law is the captive of judges' subjective whims. Such an assertion would have sounded ludicrous to the English as well as to the founders. But as Strauss - and volumes of legal history - unsurprisingly demonstrate, the common law tradition is the key to constitutional interpretation. The common law is an inherently conservative instrument. It evolves incrementally. Those who complain about the "living Constitution" argue that judges merely rule according to their subjective prejudices. They contend that it is the legislative branch that should be charged with interpreting the Constitution. Of course, all three branches of government must interpret the Constitution from time to time. But the legislative branch should not have the last word in determining whether its own enactments meet constitutional scrutiny: To borrow from Chief Justice Coke, no one (including the legislature) may be the judge of his own cause. The function of determining whether legislation conforms to the Constitution has been and still is wisely confided to the courts, which by virtue of centuries of practice (as reflected in published opinions) have substantial expertise in the area and are independent. One also hears complaints that judges are insulated from reality. But courts are not insulated - they are independent. And they are independent precisely so they are not subject to being influenced by lobbyists or terrified by a challenger in a primary election. To show how the common law works, Strauss discusses the evolution of constitutional thought in relation to two major issues: freedom of speech and segregation in public schools. He explains how the "clear and present danger" test in freedom of speech cases evolved, implicating not just such considerations as the threat of imminent harm, but also that some kinds of speech have lower societal value (libel, obscenity, fighting words), while other kinds of speech have more societal value (great literature, political speech). Strauss goes on to discuss how Brown v. Board of Education (1954) was far less a radical overturning of an entrenched precedent, Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), than a logical step in the development of the law. In so doing, he uses an example from the law of torts, where customers injured by dangerous products originally were barred from suing the manufacturer unless they had a contractual relationship with it. At first, the fact that a product was inherently dangerous overcame the requirement of a contractual relationship. As it became harder to draw a line between ordinary products and those that were inherently dangerous, however, the old requirement of a contractual relationship was found to have outworn its purpose and customers were permitted to sue the manufacturer who had created a foreseeable risk of harm. Thus, in products liability cases, as in racial equality cases, the law evolved to meet the new demands posed by changed circumstances. Strauss shows the development of the law by discussing cases on racial equality decided after Plessy that gradually undercut the Plessy decision until it was no longer tenable. Strauss does what law professors do every day: teach the law by showing how it evolved. His explanation, however, is so concise and clear that it makes the discussion seem not just sensible but compelling. Thus we see that the law works. As Strauss points out, we never wrangle over some constitutional issues because they are cut and dried (you have to be 30 years old to be a senator) or because certainty is required (January 20 is the day the new president takes office, no matter how unstable the current domestic or world situation). Other provisions require more effort to interpret, but this is because the founders brilliantly provided that some matters could be spelled out specifically in advance, while others would have to be expressed in more general terms, which could be adjusted to changing needs and times (e.g., the "necessary and proper" clause in Article I, Sec. 8). Interestingly, Strauss does not consider amendments to the Constitution to be part of what makes it a living document, since the amendment process is so onerous, slow, and seldom used. He points out how some amendments merely ratified the status quo, or served to clean up outliers, resolved technical issues, or were ahead of their time. As he offers these judgments, which seem balanced and reasonable, he also explains some of the less familiar amendments in a way that will have readers raising their eyebrows and saying "Oh, so that's where that came from." At the outset of the book, Strauss sets out three objections to originalism: That it is often, as a practical matter, impossible even for professional historians to discover what the intentions were of various founders with respect to matters discussed in the Constitution. That even if an intent of the founders could be discovered, it would pertain to the understanding they had about their world: how does one go about trying to fit that understanding to our world? That as Thomas Jefferson pointed out, one generation is to another as one sovereign nation is to another. The world belongs to the living. The notions of people long dead cannot bind us in the present or future. Strauss correctly observes that the third of these objections is by itself fatal to originalism. The founders were not so impressed with themselves that they felt their "intentions" should be forever imposed on posterity. Had they been dedicated to such a dubious project, they would surely have done a better job of documenting their debates and compromises during the Philadelphia convention. But little remains of those deliberations aside from the notes kept by James Madison. The Constitution, moreover, reflects their understanding that the future could not be shackled forever to the time in which they lived. They realized that the slave trade, for example, would prove intolerable and therefore provided that it could be abolished by at least 1808. So was their "original intent" to permit the slave trade, or was it that the slave trade should be abolished? And what does this say, if anything, about their intentions toward the institution of slavery - a word that did not even appear in the Constitution until the Thirteenth Amendment was adopted in 1865? Most damning of all to the originalist position is what Thomas Jefferson said on the subject. In a letter dated July 12, 1816, to Samuel Kercheval, Jefferson wrote "Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the arc of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and labored with it. It deserved well of its country. It was very like the present, but without the experience of the present; and forty years of experience in government is worth a century of book-reading; and this they would say themselves, were they to rise from the dead. I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with; because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them, and find practical means of correcting their ill effects. But I know also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors." He added, "Let us follow no such examples nor weakly believe that one generation is not as capable as another of taking care of itself, and of ordering its own affairs." He even called for revision of the constitution at stated periods. While originalists would love to claim Jefferson as one of their own, his words - and indeed his whole life - prove that he was completely at odds with their approach. Men like Jefferson and Franklin, who were devotees of science, were fascinated by the progress men could make in trying to understand and improve their lives. Jefferson was an eager student of nature and did considerable experimentation with crops on his plantation. He famously wrote his "Notes on the State of Virginia" to refute the widely read claims of the French naturalist Buffon about the supposedly weak, degenerate, and insipid life forms to be found in the New World. The idea that such men, who were committed to the growth of knowledge, would seek to confine all future generations to the limited understanding they possessed of the universe in 1787, is worse than laughable. It can only be explained by the polemical purposes of those whose arguments for a regressive social order are so feeble that they have to seek refuge behind an imaginary "original intent" that they erect - as if the founders wanted their limited knowledge and often unarticulated, conflicting, or ambivalent intentions to restrict the great national experiment forever. Given the explicit language of Thomas Jefferson, quoted above, it is apparent that "originalism" actually belies and defies the express intent of Jefferson, one of the most eminent of the founders. It seems paradoxical but it was his original intent that his original intent should not govern future generations! Original intent also appears anomalously restrictive when one considers that the founders never contemplated the existence of an Air Force, though they expressly provided for the Army and the Navy. And ask an originalist what the original intent was with respect to the Second Amendment's use of the term "arms." The founders had no concept of assault rifles or machine guns, let alone nerve gas, laser-guided bombs, predator drones, or nuclear weapons. How do we impose an intention on them to assert what they could not have foreseen, namely, that ordinary householders in the 21st century should have a personal, constitutional right to be able to obliterate a small army in a matter of seconds, based on the founders' notions about the 18th century saber, musket or pistol? Likewise, the Eleventh Amendment says nothing to prohibit a person from suing her own state - just other states. Yet even "textualists" read an unwritten provision into the Eleventh Amendment because it suits their view of how "sovereign" the states should be. When given this kind of a taste of their own medicine, originalists collapse in helpless sputtering and exasperation. Exposed to Strauss' very sensible discussion, the concerns of originalists reflect opportunism and disingenuousness. After all, we should not expect lawyers and judges to become armchair historians, especially under the time pressures of litigation and in the face of hotly contested issues. We should not pretend the founders had some monolithic intent, least of all with respect to matters of which they had no concept. And as Jefferson pointed out, the relationship of one generation to another is like that of one sovereign nation to another: we cannot expect to bind future generations by the intentions of people who are long since dead. In short, there will always be those who resist change and those who welcome it. If you really want to see "judicial activism" at work, you will not find much of it in the common law tradition. A far better example is the recent decision - by the so-called conservatives on the Supreme Court - in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.
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Reviewed in the United States on May 18, 2010
B
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Benjamin Douglass
Lowell, US
★★★★★ 5
An Excellent Read
Format: Kindle
The author talks about our constitution as a "living document" and expertly draws the distinction between this and the originalist interpretation as a "dead document."
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Reviewed in the United States on October 5, 2018
F
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Frederick S. Goethel
Los Angeles, US
★★★★★ 4
The Constitution: A Living or Static Document
Format: Hardcover
There has been a debate over the past several decades on whether the US Constitution is a living document that should be interpreted according to current mores and standards or whether it is a static document that should be interpreted using only the meaning found in the original wording of the document. The author, in this book, makes the case that the Constitution is, in fact, a living document that should be interpreted by modern standards and by using principles of common law. There are examples given that, quite frankly, are very persuasive. For instance, if the Constitution were interpreted using original language, we would not have the freedom of speech that we now enjoy. A careful reading of the First Amendment will show that only Congress was prohibited from making laws that abridged free speech. There were no constraints on the states or on other governmental bodies. Whether or not you agree with the author on how the Constitution should be interpreted, this book will make for some though provoking reading and interesting discussion. The book was well written, fairly easy to understand and should be read by all who are concerned about where the Supreme Court is now and where it is headed.
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Reviewed in the United States on May 23, 2010
G
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garynini
Port Orchard, US
★★★★★ 5
Clear, cogent, and illuminating
Format: Kindle
Clear, cogent, and illuminating explanation of the difference between two approaches to interpreting the Constitution: originalism and the Living Constitution
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Reviewed in the United States on September 18, 2015

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