SKU: 13457923234

COMP Cams Hi Energy Timing Chain Set Am

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COMP Cams Hi Energy Timing Chain Set AmHigh Energy Timing Set for Jeep AMC 199 258 4. 0L 6 Cylinder 1964 98. Exceed all original equipment timing chain Specifications. Premium quality link belt type timing chain for exceptional durability Catalog User 1 This Part Fits: Year Make Model Submodel 1972 1974 AM General DJ5 Base 1973 1974 AM General FJ8 Base 1965 1967 American Motors Ambassador 880 1968 1970 American Motors Ambassador Base 1968 1969,1971 American Motors Ambassador DPL 1964 1968

High Energy Timing Set for Jeep/AMC 199-258 4.0L 6 Cylinder 1964-98. Exceed all original equipment timing chain Specifications. Premium quality link belt type timing chain for exceptional durability

Catalog
User 1

This Part Fits:

Year Make Model Submodel
1972-1974 AM General DJ5 Base
1973-1974 AM General FJ8 Base
1965-1967 American Motors Ambassador 880
1968-1970 American Motors Ambassador Base
1968-1969,1971 American Motors Ambassador DPL
1964-1968 American Motors American 220
1965-1968 American Motors American 440
1964-1965 American Motors American 440H
1966-1968 American Motors American Rogue
1978-1980 American Motors AMX Base
1964-1966 American Motors Classic 550
1965 American Motors Classic 660
1964-1966 American Motors Classic 770
1978-1983 American Motors Concord Base
1979-1983 American Motors Concord DL
1979-1983 American Motors Concord Limited
1981-1988 American Motors Eagle Base
1980 American Motors Eagle DL
1981-1982 American Motors Eagle DL Kammback
1981-1983 American Motors Eagle DL SX4
1981-1982 American Motors Eagle Kammback
1980-1987 American Motors Eagle Limited
1980 American Motors Eagle Sport
1981-1983 American Motors Eagle SX4
1970-1978 American Motors Gremlin Base
1976-1978 American Motors Gremlin Custom
1977 American Motors Hornet AMX
1970-1971,1973-1977 American Motors Hornet Base
1971-1977 American Motors Hornet Sportabout
1970-1972 American Motors Hornet SST
1968-1974 American Motors Javelin Base
1968-1972 American Motors Javelin SST
1965-1967 American Motors Marlin Base
1971-1978 American Motors Matador Base
1974 American Motors Matador Brougham
1975-1978 American Motors Pacer Base
1979-1980 American Motors Pacer DL
1979-1980 American Motors Pacer Limited
1969 American Motors Rambler 440
1969 American Motors Rambler Base
1969 American Motors Rambler Rogue
1967-1968 American Motors Rebel 550
1967-1968 American Motors Rebel 770
1969-1970 American Motors Rebel Base
1967-1970 American Motors Rebel SST
1979-1982 American Motors Spirit Base
1980-1983 American Motors Spirit DL
1983 American Motors Spirit GT
1980 American Motors Spirit Limited
1974 International 100 Base
1974 International 100 Travelall
1969-1970 International 1000D Base
1971-1973 International 1010 Base
1972-1973 International 1010 Travelall
1969-1970 International 1100D Base
1971-1973 International 1110 Base
1973 International 1110 Travelall
1969-1970 International 1200D Base
1971-1973 International 1210 Base
1973 International 1210 Travelall
1969-1970 International 1300D Base
1971-1973 International 1310 Base
1974 International 200 Base
1974 International 200 Travelall
1969-1972 International M1100 Base
1969-1972 International M1200 Base
1969-1971 International M800 Base
1969 International M800 Navy Base
1969-1972 International M800 Post Office Base
1969-1971 International MA1200 Base
1974 International MHC1310 Base
1972-1974 International MS1210 Base
1969-1970 International Scout 800 Base
1971-1974 International Scout II Base
1974-1983,1987-1993 Jeep Cherokee Base
1991-1992 Jeep Cherokee Briarwood
1981-1982,1987-1988 Jeep Cherokee Chief
1996 Jeep Cherokee Classic
1993-1997 Jeep Cherokee Country
1981,1987-1992 Jeep Cherokee Laredo
1987-1992 Jeep Cherokee Limited
1983,1987-1990 Jeep Cherokee Pioneer
1974-1980 Jeep Cherokee S
1994-1997 Jeep Cherokee SE
1989-1997 Jeep Cherokee Sport
1978-1980 Jeep Cherokee Wide Track
1975-1983 Jeep Cherokee Wide Track Chief
1979-1980 Jeep Cherokee Wide Track Golden Eagle
1980-1983 Jeep Cherokee Wide Track Laredo
1980 Jeep Cherokee Wide Track Limited
1971-1983 Jeep CJ5 Base
1977-1980 Jeep CJ5 Golden Eagle
1980-1983 Jeep CJ5 Laredo
1982-1983 Jeep CJ5 Limited
1975-1983 Jeep CJ5 Renegade
1971-1975 Jeep CJ6 Base
1976-1986 Jeep CJ7 Base
1977-1979 Jeep CJ7 Golden Eagle
1980 Jeep CJ7 Golden Hawk
1980-1983,1985-1986 Jeep CJ7 Laredo
1982-1983 Jeep CJ7 Limited
1976-1986 Jeep CJ7 Renegade
1987-1992 Jeep Comanche Base
1987-1988 Jeep Comanche Chief
1988-1992 Jeep Comanche Eliminator
1987-1988 Jeep Comanche Laredo
1987-1992 Jeep Comanche Pioneer
1972-1973 Jeep Commando Base
1972-1983 Jeep DJ5 Base
1965-1969 Jeep Gladiator Base
1993 Jeep Grand Cherokee Base
1993-1997 Jeep Grand Cherokee Laredo
1993-1997 Jeep Grand Cherokee Limited
1995,1997 Jeep Grand Cherokee Orvis
1994-1995 Jeep Grand Cherokee SE
1997 Jeep Grand Cherokee TSi
1984-1986 Jeep Grand Wagoneer Base
1984-1985 Jeep Grand Wagoneer Limited
1965-1973 Jeep J-100 Base
1965-1973 Jeep J-2500 Base
1965-1973 Jeep J-2600 Base
1965-1970 Jeep J-2700 Base
1965-1968 Jeep J-2800 Base
1965-1970 Jeep J-3500 Base
1965-1970 Jeep J-3600 Base
1965-1970 Jeep J-3700 Base
1965-1971 Jeep J-3800 Base
1970-1973 Jeep J-4500 Base
1970-1973 Jeep J-4600 Base
1970-1973 Jeep J-4700 Base
1970-1973 Jeep J-4800 Base
1974-1987 Jeep J10 Base
1974,1976 Jeep J20 Base
1981-1985 Jeep Scrambler Base
1985 Jeep Scrambler Laredo
1985 Jeep Scrambler Renegade
1982-1983 Jeep Scrambler SL
1982-1984 Jeep Scrambler SR
1965-1973,1980-1982,1987 Jeep Wagoneer Base
1982-1983 Jeep Wagoneer Brougham
1973 Jeep Wagoneer Custom
1980-1983,1987-1990 Jeep Wagoneer Limited
1987-1993 Jeep Wrangler Base
1988-1992 Jeep Wrangler Islander
1987-1990 Jeep Wrangler Laredo
1991-1994 Jeep Wrangler Renegade
1988 Jeep Wrangler S
1988-1995,1997 Jeep Wrangler Sahara
1994-1995 Jeep Wrangler SE
1987-1988,1997 Jeep Wrangler Sport
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4.8 ★★★★★
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A
[email protected]
Port Orchard, US
★★★★★ 3
Good to excellent content - terrible publishing policy
Format: Hardcover
Lewis (Not "Flewis") wrote a decent text a number of years ago. It was then expanded to a companion volume (Analytical Sedimentology) with another author. The two nicely complement each other but the mind boggles at a price of almost $100 per each. The publisher has clearly made little effort to control the cost. Redundancy between the two volumes is excessive, hard cover rather than soft is used and, indeed, both could easily have been combined in one less pricey volume. A valuable resource to students and professionals has therefore been compromised by publisher, author or both due to ignorance, greed or stupidity. A terrible shame!
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Reviewed in the United States on January 5, 1998
J
Verified Purchase
JMB1014
Battle Creek, US
★★★★★ 5
An Excellent Introduction to Legal and Constitutional Reasoning
Format: Hardcover
This is an excellent introductory volume for people who feel confused by the debate over "original intent" versus a "living Constitution." David A. Strauss is a law professor at the University of Chicago. His book is a quick read (139 pages), with no notes, bibliography or other impedimenta - just an index. It's a very lucid explanation of legal reasoning and how the Supreme Court has followed this basic process over time. Hence the "living constitution" is really just an instance of the English common law tradition functioning normally. This book will teach many Americans how legal reasoning actually operates in practice. It is a common-sensical and conservative process that seeks at once to promote predictability and fairness. By and large, it has worked well. The phrase "living Constitution" has been denigrated by people who seek to turn back the calendar to a day when more "traditional" values were imposed by law. In so doing, they have invoked an historical fiction, the "original intent" of the framers of the Constitution. The myriad problems arising from this effort, if not its disingenuousness, have been discussed with insight and erudition by such excellent minds as Jack Rakove ("Original Meanings")and Akhil Reed Amar ("The Bill of Rights," and "The American Constitution: A Biography"), to name just two. The real point of this book, I think, is to explain basic legal reasoning to a mass audience. This does a great service. It also shows how naturally the common law evolves, how it tends to restrain judicial activism and yet to permit flexibility as times and circumstances change. As Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School put it in his book, "The Spirit of the Common Law," the common law is "essentially a mode of judicial and juristic thinking, a mode of treating legal problems rather than a fixed body of definite rules...." This is a critical distinction. Some so-called conservatives insist that judges must simply apply the law like automatons, as if it were a "fixed body of definite rules." They then seek to enlist the founding fathers in declaring what those rules are, or how definite they must be. But as Dean Pound and centuries of legal history demonstrate, this notion is far removed from the truth, and remote from any useful notion of adjudication. All Anglophone law schools, lawyers and judges are engaged in the process Dean Pound discusses. The common law tradition arose in England over the course of centuries. We imported it to this country in part because it was workable and practical, and because it was brilliantly and systematically expounded by Chief Justice Edward Coke in the 17th century and by Lord William Blackstone shortly before the American Revolution. No one would suggest that the common law tradition means the law is the captive of judges' subjective whims. Such an assertion would have sounded ludicrous to the English as well as to the founders. But as Strauss - and volumes of legal history - unsurprisingly demonstrate, the common law tradition is the key to constitutional interpretation. The common law is an inherently conservative instrument. It evolves incrementally. Those who complain about the "living Constitution" argue that judges merely rule according to their subjective prejudices. They contend that it is the legislative branch that should be charged with interpreting the Constitution. Of course, all three branches of government must interpret the Constitution from time to time. But the legislative branch should not have the last word in determining whether its own enactments meet constitutional scrutiny: To borrow from Chief Justice Coke, no one (including the legislature) may be the judge of his own cause. The function of determining whether legislation conforms to the Constitution has been and still is wisely confided to the courts, which by virtue of centuries of practice (as reflected in published opinions) have substantial expertise in the area and are independent. One also hears complaints that judges are insulated from reality. But courts are not insulated - they are independent. And they are independent precisely so they are not subject to being influenced by lobbyists or terrified by a challenger in a primary election. To show how the common law works, Strauss discusses the evolution of constitutional thought in relation to two major issues: freedom of speech and segregation in public schools. He explains how the "clear and present danger" test in freedom of speech cases evolved, implicating not just such considerations as the threat of imminent harm, but also that some kinds of speech have lower societal value (libel, obscenity, fighting words), while other kinds of speech have more societal value (great literature, political speech). Strauss goes on to discuss how Brown v. Board of Education (1954) was far less a radical overturning of an entrenched precedent, Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), than a logical step in the development of the law. In so doing, he uses an example from the law of torts, where customers injured by dangerous products originally were barred from suing the manufacturer unless they had a contractual relationship with it. At first, the fact that a product was inherently dangerous overcame the requirement of a contractual relationship. As it became harder to draw a line between ordinary products and those that were inherently dangerous, however, the old requirement of a contractual relationship was found to have outworn its purpose and customers were permitted to sue the manufacturer who had created a foreseeable risk of harm. Thus, in products liability cases, as in racial equality cases, the law evolved to meet the new demands posed by changed circumstances. Strauss shows the development of the law by discussing cases on racial equality decided after Plessy that gradually undercut the Plessy decision until it was no longer tenable. Strauss does what law professors do every day: teach the law by showing how it evolved. His explanation, however, is so concise and clear that it makes the discussion seem not just sensible but compelling. Thus we see that the law works. As Strauss points out, we never wrangle over some constitutional issues because they are cut and dried (you have to be 30 years old to be a senator) or because certainty is required (January 20 is the day the new president takes office, no matter how unstable the current domestic or world situation). Other provisions require more effort to interpret, but this is because the founders brilliantly provided that some matters could be spelled out specifically in advance, while others would have to be expressed in more general terms, which could be adjusted to changing needs and times (e.g., the "necessary and proper" clause in Article I, Sec. 8). Interestingly, Strauss does not consider amendments to the Constitution to be part of what makes it a living document, since the amendment process is so onerous, slow, and seldom used. He points out how some amendments merely ratified the status quo, or served to clean up outliers, resolved technical issues, or were ahead of their time. As he offers these judgments, which seem balanced and reasonable, he also explains some of the less familiar amendments in a way that will have readers raising their eyebrows and saying "Oh, so that's where that came from." At the outset of the book, Strauss sets out three objections to originalism: That it is often, as a practical matter, impossible even for professional historians to discover what the intentions were of various founders with respect to matters discussed in the Constitution. That even if an intent of the founders could be discovered, it would pertain to the understanding they had about their world: how does one go about trying to fit that understanding to our world? That as Thomas Jefferson pointed out, one generation is to another as one sovereign nation is to another. The world belongs to the living. The notions of people long dead cannot bind us in the present or future. Strauss correctly observes that the third of these objections is by itself fatal to originalism. The founders were not so impressed with themselves that they felt their "intentions" should be forever imposed on posterity. Had they been dedicated to such a dubious project, they would surely have done a better job of documenting their debates and compromises during the Philadelphia convention. But little remains of those deliberations aside from the notes kept by James Madison. The Constitution, moreover, reflects their understanding that the future could not be shackled forever to the time in which they lived. They realized that the slave trade, for example, would prove intolerable and therefore provided that it could be abolished by at least 1808. So was their "original intent" to permit the slave trade, or was it that the slave trade should be abolished? And what does this say, if anything, about their intentions toward the institution of slavery - a word that did not even appear in the Constitution until the Thirteenth Amendment was adopted in 1865? Most damning of all to the originalist position is what Thomas Jefferson said on the subject. In a letter dated July 12, 1816, to Samuel Kercheval, Jefferson wrote "Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the arc of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and labored with it. It deserved well of its country. It was very like the present, but without the experience of the present; and forty years of experience in government is worth a century of book-reading; and this they would say themselves, were they to rise from the dead. I am certainly not an advocate for frequent and untried changes in laws and constitutions. I think moderate imperfections had better be borne with; because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to them, and find practical means of correcting their ill effects. But I know also, that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors." He added, "Let us follow no such examples nor weakly believe that one generation is not as capable as another of taking care of itself, and of ordering its own affairs." He even called for revision of the constitution at stated periods. While originalists would love to claim Jefferson as one of their own, his words - and indeed his whole life - prove that he was completely at odds with their approach. Men like Jefferson and Franklin, who were devotees of science, were fascinated by the progress men could make in trying to understand and improve their lives. Jefferson was an eager student of nature and did considerable experimentation with crops on his plantation. He famously wrote his "Notes on the State of Virginia" to refute the widely read claims of the French naturalist Buffon about the supposedly weak, degenerate, and insipid life forms to be found in the New World. The idea that such men, who were committed to the growth of knowledge, would seek to confine all future generations to the limited understanding they possessed of the universe in 1787, is worse than laughable. It can only be explained by the polemical purposes of those whose arguments for a regressive social order are so feeble that they have to seek refuge behind an imaginary "original intent" that they erect - as if the founders wanted their limited knowledge and often unarticulated, conflicting, or ambivalent intentions to restrict the great national experiment forever. Given the explicit language of Thomas Jefferson, quoted above, it is apparent that "originalism" actually belies and defies the express intent of Jefferson, one of the most eminent of the founders. It seems paradoxical but it was his original intent that his original intent should not govern future generations! Original intent also appears anomalously restrictive when one considers that the founders never contemplated the existence of an Air Force, though they expressly provided for the Army and the Navy. And ask an originalist what the original intent was with respect to the Second Amendment's use of the term "arms." The founders had no concept of assault rifles or machine guns, let alone nerve gas, laser-guided bombs, predator drones, or nuclear weapons. How do we impose an intention on them to assert what they could not have foreseen, namely, that ordinary householders in the 21st century should have a personal, constitutional right to be able to obliterate a small army in a matter of seconds, based on the founders' notions about the 18th century saber, musket or pistol? Likewise, the Eleventh Amendment says nothing to prohibit a person from suing her own state - just other states. Yet even "textualists" read an unwritten provision into the Eleventh Amendment because it suits their view of how "sovereign" the states should be. When given this kind of a taste of their own medicine, originalists collapse in helpless sputtering and exasperation. Exposed to Strauss' very sensible discussion, the concerns of originalists reflect opportunism and disingenuousness. After all, we should not expect lawyers and judges to become armchair historians, especially under the time pressures of litigation and in the face of hotly contested issues. We should not pretend the founders had some monolithic intent, least of all with respect to matters of which they had no concept. And as Jefferson pointed out, the relationship of one generation to another is like that of one sovereign nation to another: we cannot expect to bind future generations by the intentions of people who are long since dead. In short, there will always be those who resist change and those who welcome it. If you really want to see "judicial activism" at work, you will not find much of it in the common law tradition. A far better example is the recent decision - by the so-called conservatives on the Supreme Court - in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.
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Reviewed in the United States on May 18, 2010
B
Verified Purchase
Benjamin Douglass
Massapequa, US
★★★★★ 5
An Excellent Read
Format: Kindle
The author talks about our constitution as a "living document" and expertly draws the distinction between this and the originalist interpretation as a "dead document."
WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare
Reviewed in the United States on October 5, 2018
F
Verified Purchase
Frederick S. Goethel
Battle Creek, US
★★★★★ 4
The Constitution: A Living or Static Document
Format: Hardcover
There has been a debate over the past several decades on whether the US Constitution is a living document that should be interpreted according to current mores and standards or whether it is a static document that should be interpreted using only the meaning found in the original wording of the document. The author, in this book, makes the case that the Constitution is, in fact, a living document that should be interpreted by modern standards and by using principles of common law. There are examples given that, quite frankly, are very persuasive. For instance, if the Constitution were interpreted using original language, we would not have the freedom of speech that we now enjoy. A careful reading of the First Amendment will show that only Congress was prohibited from making laws that abridged free speech. There were no constraints on the states or on other governmental bodies. Whether or not you agree with the author on how the Constitution should be interpreted, this book will make for some though provoking reading and interesting discussion. The book was well written, fairly easy to understand and should be read by all who are concerned about where the Supreme Court is now and where it is headed.
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Reviewed in the United States on May 23, 2010
G
Verified Purchase
garynini
San Leandro, US
★★★★★ 5
Clear, cogent, and illuminating
Format: Kindle
Clear, cogent, and illuminating explanation of the difference between two approaches to interpreting the Constitution: originalism and the Living Constitution
WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare
Reviewed in the United States on September 18, 2015

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